Abstract-At Crypto'07, Goyal introduced the concept of Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption (A-IBE) as a convenient tool to reduce the amount of trust in authorities in Identity-Based Encryption. In this model, if the Private Key Generator (PKG) maliciously re-distributes users' decryption keys, it runs the risk of being caught and prosecuted. Goyal proposed two constructions: the first one is efficient but can only trace well-formed decryption keys to their source; the second one allows tracing obfuscated decryption boxes in a model (called weak black-box model) where cheating authorities have no decryption oracle. The latter scheme is unfortunately far less efficient in terms of decryption cost and ciphertext size. The contribution of this paper is to describe a new construction that combines the efficiency of Goyal's first proposal with a simple weak black-box tracing mechanism. The proposed scheme is the first A-IBE that meets all security properties (although traceability is only guaranteed in the weak black-box model) in the adaptive-ID sense.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
DENTITY-BASED cryptography, first proposed by Shamir [43] , alleviates the need for digital certificates used in traditional public-key infrastructures. In such systems, users' public keys are public identifiers (e.g., email addresses) and the matching private keys are derived by a trusted party called Private Key Generator (PKG). The first practical construction for Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was put forth by Boneh and Franklin [10] , [46] -despite the bandwidth-demanding proposal by Cocks [19] -and, since then, a large body of work has been devoted to the design of schemes with additional properties or relying on different algorithmic assumptions [28] , [7] , [8] , [39] , [45] , [9] , [25] , [15] , [11] .
In spite of its appealing advantages, Identity-Based Encryption has not undergone rapid adoption as a standard. The main reason is arguably the fact that it requires unconditional trust in the PKG: the latter can indeed decrypt any ciphertext or, even worse, re-distribute users' private keys. The key escrow problem can be mitigated as suggested in [10] , [46] by sharing the master secret among multiple PKGs, but this inevitably entails extra communication and infrastructure. Related paradigms [24] , [3] strived to remove the key escrow problem but only did so at the expense of losing the benefit of human-memorizable public keys: these models get rid of escrow authorities but both involve traditional (though not explicitly certified) public keys that are usually less convenient to work with than easy-to-remember public identifiers.
In 2007, Goyal [29] explored a new approach to deter rogue actions from authorities. With the Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption (A-IBE) primitive, if the PKG discloses a decryption key associated with some identity over the Internet, it runs the risk of being caught and sued by the user. A-IBE schemes achieve this goal by means of an interactive private key generation protocol between the user and the PKG. For each identity, there are exponentially-many families of possible decryption keys. The key generation protocol provides the user with a single decryption key while concealing to the PKG the family that this key belongs to. From this private key, the user is computationally unable to find one from a different family. Hence, for a given identity, a pair of private keys from distinct families serves as evidence of a fraudulent PKG. The latter remains able to passively eavesdrop communications but is discouraged to reveal users' private keys. Also, users cannot falsely accuse an honest PKG since they are unable to compute a new key from a different family using a given key. PRIOR WORKS. Two constructions were given in [29] . The first one (that we call -hereafter) builds on Gentry's IBE scheme [25] and, while efficient, only allows tracing well-formed decryption keys. This white-box model seems unlikely to suffice in practice since malicious parties can rather release an imperfect and/or obfuscated program that only decrypts with small but noticeable probability. The second scheme of [29] (let us call it -), which is constructed from the Sahai-Waters fuzzy IBE scheme [39] , has a variant providing weak black-box traceability: even an imperfect pirate decryption box can be traced (based on its input/output behavior) back to its source although traceability is only guaranteed against dishonest PKGs that have no decryption oracle in the attack game. However, -is somewhat inefficient as decryption requires a number of pairing calculations that is linear in the security parameter. For the usually required security level, ciphertexts contain more than 160 group elements and decryption calculates a product of about 160 pairings.
Subsequently, Au et al. [4] described another A-IBE scheme providing retrievability (i.e., a property that prevents the PKG 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE from revealing more than one key for a given identity without exposing its master key) but remained in the white-box model. More recently, Goyal et al. [30] modified the -system using attribute-based encryption techniques [39] , [31] to achieve full black-box traceability: unlike -, the scheme of [30] preserves security against dishonest PKGs that have access to a decryption oracle in the model. While definitely desirable in practice, this property is currently achievable only at the expense of the same significant penalty as in - [29] in terms of decryption cost and ciphertext size. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS. We present a very efficient and conceptually simple scheme with weak black-box traceability. We prove its security (in the standard model) under the same assumption as was used to prove the security of -. Decryption keys and ciphertexts consist of a constant number of group elements and their length is thus linear in the security parameter (instead of quadratic as in -). Encryption and decryption take -time (compared to in -) with only two pairing computations being needed for decryption (against more than 160 in -). The system is analyzed the adaptive-ID model of [10] , [46] , as opposed to the selective-ID security model (where adversaries must choose the identity that will be their target at the outset of the game). In contrast, one of the security properties (i.e., the infeasibility for users to frame innocent PKGs) was only established in the selective-ID setting for known schemes in the black-box model (i.e.,
-and its fully black-box extension [30] ). Among such schemes, ours thus appears to be the first one that can be tweaked so as to achieve adaptive-ID security against dishonest users.
Our scheme performs almost as well as -(the main overhead being a long master public key à la Waters [45] to obtain the adaptive-ID security). In comparison with -, that was only analyzed in a white-box model of traceability, our system provides several other advantages.
As an extension to the proceedings version of this paper [36] , we also show how to apply the idea of our weak black-box tracing mechanism to Gentry's IBE scheme. The resulting A-IBE system is obtained by making a simple modification to the key generation protocol of -so as to perfectly hide the user's key family from the PKG's view while preserving the efficiency of the whole scheme. Since the resulting system inherits the efficiency of Gentry's IBE scheme and the -white-box A-IBE scheme, it turns out to be the most efficient weakly black-box A-IBE construction to date. Its (adaptive-ID) security is moreover proved under a tight reduction (albeit under a strong assumption).
Finally, since detecting misbehaving PKGs is an equally relevant problem in IBE primitives and their generalizations, we show how the underlying idea of previous schemes can be applied to one of the most practical Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE) realizations [12] . We also argue that the same technique similarly applies in the context of attribute-based encryption [39] , [31] . ORGANIZATION. In the rest of the paper, Section II recalls the A-IBE security model defined in [29] . We first analyze the basic version of our scheme in Section III. Sections IV and V describe and analyze the extensions of our method to Gentry's IBE scheme and the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
SYNTACTIC DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL. We recall the definition of A-IBE schemes and their security properties as defined in [29] .
Definition 1: An Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption scheme (A-IBE) is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms or protocols such that:
• takes as input a security parameter and outputs a master public key and a matching master secret key .
• is an interactive protocol between the public parameter generator and the user : the common input to PKG and are: the master public key and an identity for which the decryption key has to be generated; the private input to PKG is the master secret key . Both parties may use a sequence of private coin tosses as additional inputs. The above definition is for the white-box setting. In a black-box model, takes as input an identity , the corresponding user's well-formed private key and a decryption box , modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, that successfully opens a non-negligible fraction of ciphertexts encrypted under . The output of is either "PKG" or "User" depending on which party is found guilty for having crafted .
Goyal formalized three security properties for A-IBE schemes. The first one is the standard notion of privacy [10] , [46] for IBE systems. As for the other ones, the game captures the intractability for the PKG to create a decryption key of the same family as the one obtained by the user during the key generation protocol. Finally, the game models the infeasibility for users to generate a key outside the family of the legally obtained one . We consider the following games, where is a security parameter and is a second parameter (also given as input):
The A-IBE scheme is termed --secure if for all PPT algorithms and all , the advantage of defined by the corresponding experiment is a negligible function of . Here, the adversary acts as a cheating PKG and the challenger emulates the honest user. Both parties engage in a key generation protocol where the challenger obtains a private key for an identity chosen by . The latter aims at producing a private key corresponding to and belonging to the same family as the key obtained by the challenger in the key generation protocol. Such a successful dishonest PKG could disclose user keys without being caught.
Note that, at the beginning of the experiment, generates without revealing the master key and the challenger runs a sanity check on . As noted in [29] , [30] , it makes sense to provide with a decryption oracle that undoes ciphertexts using (and could possibly leak information on the latter's family). We call this enhanced security notion --security (as opposed to the weaker one which we call --security). Finally, in the black-box model, instead of outputting a new key , the dishonest PKG comes up with a decryption box which is -useful for and , i.e., such that with probability taken over the plaintext and the random coins used by the algorithm. The dishonest PKG wins if the tracing algorithm returns "User" when run on and with oracle access to . We call this enhanced notion security when is not 1 given access to a decryption oracle that undoes ciphertexts using . 3. The game. Let be a PPT algorithm. We consider the following games, where is a security parameter and is a second parameter (also given as input):
For ---, 's advantage is . 1 If has access to the decryption oracle, one obtain the strong black-box security notion. Therefore, using intuitive naming conventions, the strong-security notion is the --whereas -is the --security notion.
The A-IBE scheme is termed -secure if for all PPT algorithms and all , the advantage of defined by the following experiment is a negligible function of . The --game involves an adversary interacting with a PKG in executions of the key generation protocol and obtaining private keys associated with distinct identities of her choosing. The adversary is declared successful if, for some identity that may have been queried for key generation, she is able to find two private keys from distinct families. Such a pair would allow her to trick a judge into wrongly believing that the PKG has misbehaved.
In the black-box scenario --, the output of the dishonest user consist of a key and a pirate decryption box which is -useful for and , i.e., such that with probability taken over the plaintext and the random coins used by the algorithm. In this case, the adversary wins if the output of is "PKG". Finally, the relaxed "selective-ID" model can be naturally extended to the security notion ( --and --). BILINEAR MAPS AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS. In the following, we review the definition of cryptographic bilinear maps and we do not pin down any particular generator, but instead parameterize definitions and security results by a choice of generator. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to so-called symmetric bilinear groups [23] , however, our constructions extend readily to the asymmetric bilinear group setting. is non degenerate (i.e., for some ); c) there exists an efficient algorithm to compute . In such bilinear groups, we assume the hardness of the (now classical) Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem that has been widely used in the recent years. The Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH) is to distinguish the distributions of tuples and in for random values . The advantage of a distinguisher is defined as follows:
Definition 4: Let be a bilinear-group generator and let be a -valued PPT algorithm. We consider the following random experiments, where is a security parameter:
's advantage is defined as
The bilinear-group generator is said DBDH-secure if, for all PPT algorithms 's advantage is a negligible function of . In this case, we say that the DBDH assumption holds for .
For convenience, we use an equivalent formulation-called modified DBDH-of the problem which is to distinguish from random given .
III. THE SCHEME
The scheme mixes ideas from the "commutative-blinding" [7] and "exponent-inversion" [40] frameworks. Private keys have the same shape as in commutative-blinding-based schemes [7] , [8] , [45] , [15] . At the same time, their first element is a product of two terms, the first one of which is inspired from Gentry's IBE scheme [25] .
Following a technique applied in [29] , private keys contain a family number that cannot be tampered with while remaining hidden from the PKG. This family number is determined by combining two random values and respectively chosen by the user and the PKG in the key generation protocol. The latter begins with the user sending a commitment to . Upon receiving , the PKG turns it into a commitment to and uses the modified commitment to generate a "blinded" private key . The user obtains his final key by "unblinding" thanks to the randomness that was used to compute .
A difference with -is that, at the end of the key generation protocol, the private key component is perfectly hidden from the PKG and the security against dishonest PKGs is unconditional. In the key generation protocol, the user's first message is a perfectly hiding commitment that comes along with a witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof of knowledge of its opening. In -, users rather send a deterministic (and thus nonstatistically hiding) commitment and knowledge of the underlying value must be proven in zero-knowledge because a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm must be simulated (by rewinding the cheating verifier) in the proof of security against dishonest PKGs. In the present scheme, the latter proof does not rely on a specific assumption and we do not need to simulate knowing the solution of a particular problem instance. Therefore, we can dispense with perfectly ZK proofs and settle for a more efficient 3-move WI proof (such as Okamoto's variant [37] of Schnorr [42] ) whereas 4 rounds are needed using zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
A. Description of
Let be a bilinear-group generator.
Setup
: given , the PKG selects bilinear groups of prime order (by running ) and a random generator . It chooses , a vector and at random. It then defines the master public key as while the master secret key is . Keygen
: to obtain a private key for his identity , a user interacts with the PKG in the following key generation protocol, where the notation denotes .
1. The user draws , provides the PKG with a commitment and also runs an interactive witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the pair with the PKG, which he retains for later use. 2. The PKG outputs if the proof of knowledge fails to verify. Otherwise, it picks and returns (1) 3. picks and computes which should equal (2) where . Then, checks whether satisfies the relation (3) If so, he sets his private key as and the latter belongs to the family of decryption keys identified by . He outputs otherwise. Encrypt: to encrypt a message given and the identity , first define the value . Then, choose and compute (4) Decrypt: given and the decryption key , compute
The correctness of the scheme follows from the fact that wellformed private keys always satisfy relation (3). By raising both sides of (3) to the power , we see that the quotient of pairings in (5) actually equals .
The scheme features about the same efficiency as classical IBE schemes derived from the commutative-blinding framework [7] . Encryption demands no pairing calculation since and can both be cached as part of the system parameters. Decryption requires the computation of a quotient of two pairings which is significantly faster than two independent pairing evaluations when optimized in the same way as modular multi-exponentiations [27] .
In comparison with the most efficient standard model scheme based on the same assumption (which is currently the first scheme of [7] ), the only overhead is a slightly longer ciphertext and an extra exponentiation in in encryption and decryption processes. Now, we describe a black-box tracing mechanism that protects the user from a dishonest PKG as long as the latter is withheld access to a decryption oracle. The tracing strategy is close to the one used by Kiayias and Yung [33] in 2-user traitor tracing schemes, where the tracer determines which one out of two subscribers produced a pirate decoder. In our setting, one rather has to decide whether an -useful decryption device stems from the PKG or the user himself.
Trace : given a well-formed private key belonging to a user of identity and oracle access to a decoder that decrypts ciphertexts encrypted for with probability , conduct the following steps. a. 
B. --Security
We first prove the --security of under the modified assumption (mDBDH). for some random and thus , which means that is perfectly hidden since is independent of 's view. At this stage the adversary's probability of success could be correlated with the probability that needs to "naturally" abort (i.e., because in some key generation query or in the challenge phase). As in [45] , one way to compensate this possible dependency is to introduce an artificial abort step that forces to always abort with the maximal probability, regardless of the particular set of queries made by . Namely, with , the same analysis as [45] shows that 's probability not to abort for any set of queries is at least .
Lemma 1:
The probability that the simulator does not abort for any set of queries is at least . Proof: If denotes the challenge identity and if queries private keys for the identities , we have . Indeed, recall that has no information on the values and she can only come up with such that by chance so that Also, a sufficient condition to have is to have and we thus consider this condition. We have At the end of the game, considers the sequence of queries made by and estimate the probability that it causes the simulation to abort. This does not require new executions of but rather involves repeatedly sampling vectors and assess and accordingly. Once the estimated probability has been obtained after samples, if , the simulator artificially aborts and outputs a random bit with probability (and continues with probability ). Eventually, if did not naturally or artificially abort, it outputs 1 (meaning that ) if successfully guesses and 0 otherwise. Using exactly the same analysis as in [45] , we obtain that, if 's advantage is breaks the assumption with probability .
As in [45] , the Proof of Theorem 1 makes use of the artificial abort step to ensure that the simulator's probability to abort is independent of the particular set of queries made by the adversary. The technique of Bellare and Ristenpart [6] can be applied to avoid this step and obtain an improved concrete security.
C. and Security
The soundness of the tracing algorithm is proved using a similar technique to [1] . To ensure the independence of iterations, we assume (as in [1] ) that pirate devices are stateless, or resettable, and do not retain information from prior queries: each decryption query is answered as if it were the first one and, in particular, the pirate device cannot self-destruct.
Theorem 2:
The scheme is ---secure under the assumption in . More precisely, the advantage of any adversary , running in time , in building a -useful decryption box, after key generation queries, is at most for all algorithms running in time at most where . Proof: We consider a --adversary and we construct a algorithm that will play the role of the --challenger. Algorithm gets a instance and generates the master public key as , , for some , and the vector is set up so as to have for efficiently computable functions . Then, is given the master public key and starts making key generation queries that the simulator handles as follows. It will have to guess upfront (with probability ) which key generation query will involve the target identity . At the outset of the game, thus picks a random index and eventually aborts if the target identity did not appear in the key generation query. During the game, it also aborts if one of the following events occurs.
A . Otherwise, it necessarily knows a valid full private key for the identity . At this stage, an artificial abort step is needed to make sure that always aborts with the maximal probability regardless of the specific set of queries made by . This time, the lower bound for 's probability not to abort for any set of queries is (in comparison with the Proof of Theorem 1, an additional factor of is lost due to the random choice of at the beginning of the game). Algorithm then holds a -useful decryption box for the identity and and it will use it to determine whether is equal to or random. It uses the decryption key to construct random ciphertexts for as where is part of the instance and are picked independently and uniformly at random for each . Algorithm simulates the tracing algorithm with these ciphertexts . If , all ciphertexts are properly formed encryptions of plaintexts with the encryption exponents and correctly decrypts with probability . If (say, for some random ), is given ciphertexts where each has been tampered with and thus corresponds to a ciphertext produced by the tracing algorithm with the encryption exponents and (observe that, since , these look independent to the adversary).
The tracing algorithm (simulated by ) points to the PKG if it ends up with the value . If , the variable can be seen as the sum of independent random variables having the same expected value . We have . The Chernoff bound tells us that, for any real number such that , it holds that With , the Chernoff bound guarantees that If , conditionally on the simulator not aborting, the decoder must output the correct plaintext at some iteration with overwhelming probability . In other words, if we call the event of the tracing procedure ending up with , we have when . Moreover, if occurs with substantially higher probability when is replaced by , there must be a distinguisher for the assumption. Since the advantage of is precisely the probability when , it comes that cannot frame the PKG if the assumption holds. Taking the artificial abort step (which is conducted by exactly as in the Proof of Theorem 1) into account, it eventually comes that
The system turns out to be the first scheme that achieves weak black-box traceability against dishonest users in the adaptive-ID sense. Due to their reliance on attribute-based encryption techniques (for which only selective-ID adversaries were dealt with until very recently), earlier (weak) black-box A-IBE proposals [29] , [30] are only known to provide selective-ID security against dishonest users.
As for the security against dishonest PKGs, we observe that, in the -game, the last part of the user's private key is perfectly hidden to the malicious PKG after the key generation protocol. Then, a pirate decoder made by the PKG has negligible chance of decrypting ciphertexts where is random in the same way as the user would. When the user comes across and takes it to the court, the latter runs the tracing algorithm using and the user's well-formed key for which is independent of .
Lemma 2:
In the -game, one iteration of the tracing algorithm increases the counter with probability at most . Proof: After the key generation protocol, a dishonest PKG has no information on part of the user's private key. This follows from the perfectly hiding property of Pedersen's commitment [38] and the perfect witness indistinguishability of the protocol [37] for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation. Since the commitment and the proof of knowledge of perfectly hide to the PKG, all elements of are equally likely values of as for the last part of the user's private key.
In an iteration of the tracing stage, the decoder is given such that and for distinct . Since has no information on , for any plaintext , there is a value that explains and it comes that returns the one chosen by the tracer with probability .
We note that a pirate device generated by the dishonest PKG is able to recognize invalid ciphertexts in the tracing stage (as it may contain the master secret ). However, as long as is assumed stateless, it cannot shutdown or self-destruct when detecting a tracing attempt. Moreover, with all but negligible probability, it will never be able to decrypt such invalid ciphertexts in the same way as the owner of would.
Theorem 3:
The scheme is statistically --secure. More precisely, the advantage of any adversary in building a -useful decryption box is at most . Proof: The dishonest PKG is not detected if it outputs a decryption box for which the tracing algorithm ends with a nonzero value of . However, this can only happen with negligible probability. Indeed, from Lemma 2, it easily comes that .
To secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks and preserve the weak black-box property, we can use the CanettiHalevi-Katz [17] technique or its optimizations [13] , [14] that do not affect the tracing algorithm.
IV. EXTENSION TO GENTRY'S IBE SCHEME
In this section, we show how to apply the weak black-box tracing mechanism of Section III to Gentry's IBE scheme. The resulting A-IBE scheme, called -, system is obtained by bringing a simple modification to the key generation protocol of Goyal's first scheme [29] so as to perfectly hide the user's key family from the PKG's view while preserving the efficiency of the whole scheme.
The advantage of this scheme is to directly provide adaptive-ID security against dishonest users and under reductions that are just as tight as in Gentry's system. On the other hand, as in [25] , a stronger assumption is needed in security proofs.
The -Decision Augmented Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem (q-ADBDHE) is to distinguish from a random element in given for a random triple .
Definition 5 ([25]):
Let be a bilinear-group generator and let be a -valued PPT algorithm. We consider the following experiment, where is a security parameter:
's advantage is measured by Analogously to definition 4, the bilinear-group generator is said -ADBDHE-secure if, for all PPT algorithms , the advantage of is a negligible function of . In this case, we say that the -ADBDHE assumption holds for .
A. Description of
In the description hereafter, the encryption and decryption algorithms are exactly as in [25] . Since the key generation protocol perfectly conceals the user's key family, we can apply the same weak black-box tracing mechanism as in Section III. The resulting system turns out to be the most efficient adaptive-ID secure weakly black-box A-IBE scheme to date.
Let 
B. Security
The --security of the schemecan be simply reduced to that of Gentry's IBE scheme as shown in the proof of the next theorem.
Theorem 4:
Any --adversary againstimplies an attacker against Gentry's IBE scheme.
Proof: Let us assume an --adversary in the game described by definition 2. We show that gives rise to an --adversary against Gentry's IBE scheme. Our adversary receives as input a master public key from her challenger. When the A-IBE adversary makes a key generation request for an identity , queries her own challenger to extract a private key and starts executing the key generation protocol with in interaction with . The latter first supplies a commitment and an interactive WI proof of knowledge of the pair . Using the knowledge extractor of the proof of knowledge, extracts by rewinding and returns , where and . In the challenge phase, chooses a target identity and messages , which forwards to her own challenger. The latter provides with a challenge ciphertext which is relayed to . After a second series of key generation queries, outputs a bit , which is also 's output. It is easy to see that, if is successful, so is .
We now turn to prove the weak black-box traceability property.
Theorem 5:
In the Adaptive-ID --game and for a -useful device , the probability that the tracing algorithm accuses the PKG is at most , where is the number of key generation queries.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of --security in [25] . For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that the dishonest user gets the tracing algorithm to accuse the PKG with non-negligible probability. Then, we can construct a distinguisher for the -ADBDHE assumption.
The Using the same arguments as in the Proof of Theorem 2, we find that, if , the probability that never manages to return the correct plaintext is smaller than . Moreover, if the probability of the latter event becomes non-negligible when , there must be a distinguisher for the -ADBDHE assumption. In summary, if eventually frames the PKG, it should be able to somehow distinguish valid ciphertexts from those produced by the tracing algorithm and the -ADBDHE assumption is broken.
The weak black-box security against dishonest PKGs follows from the information theoretic secrecy of the user's private key element upon termination of the key generation protocol.
Lemma 3:
In the -game, each iteration of the tracing procedure increases the counter with probability at most . Proof: As in the Proof of Lemma 2, during the key generation protocol, the dishonest PKG obtains no information on part of the user's key thanks to the unconditional hiding property of Pedersen's commitment [38] and the perfect witness indistinguishability of the interactive proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation [37] .
Let us consider what happens in one iteration of the tracing algorithm. The pirate decryption device is given a ciphertext such that , and for distinct exponents . Since the pirate device has no information on , for any message , there exists a value that explains . Hence, has probability at most to return the particular plaintext that was chosen at random by the tracer.
Theorem 6:
In the information theoretic sense, no (computationally unbounded) adversary has non-negligible advantage in the -game. Proof: The dishonest PKG wins the -game if it outputs a decryption box for which the tracing procedure increases at least once. However, this only happens with negligible probability. Indeed, from Lemma 3, we find that To secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks, we cannot use hash proof systems as suggested in [25] , [34] . This technique would indeed cause the decryption algorithm to reject all invalid ciphertexts with high probability, which would not be compatible with our weak black-box tracing mechanism.
Fortunately, CCA-security can be acquired by applying the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transformation to a two-receiver variant of the Gentry-Waters Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE) scheme [26] , which is very similar to Gentry's IBE in the shape of its ciphertexts and private keys. In this section, we chose to illustrate how the weak black-box technique can be applied to Gentry's IBE for the sake of simplicity since the Gentry-Waters system is substantially more complex to describe.
An IBBE scheme is an IBE scheme where the sender can encrypt a message for several receivers using their identities (a formal definition is given in Section A): the sender takes as input the master public key and a set of identities and computes a ciphertext which can be decrypted using a private key for any identity . The --security of IBBE schemes is defined by a game where the adversary can obtain private keys for arbitrary identities as in the usual notion of --security. In the challenge phase, the adversary chooses an identity set o and obtains an encryption of a message , for a random bit which the adversary has to guess without obtaining private keys for identities in at any time. From an --security secure IBBE scheme where the sender can encrypt a ciphertext for up to identities, the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transform gives a CCA2-secure IBBE scheme where ciphertexts can be encrypted for at most receivers. The setup algorithms are identical in both schemes whereas derives keys using the key generation algorithm of as . In order to encrypt a message for the receiver set , the encryption algorithm of proceeds by first generating a one-time signature key pair and computing the ciphertext for the identity set . The final ciphertext consists of , where is a one-time signature of the message . It is easy to see (as previously reported in [22] for instance) that the resulting IBBE is --secure as long as --secure and the one-time signature is strongly unforgeable.
From a two-receiver variant of the Gentry-Waters IBBE, we can thus construct an --(single receiver) IBE in a very simple way: one of the two receivers' identities is set to be the verification key of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature and the matching private key is used to sign the whole ciphertext.
Our tracing algorithm can be combined with the latter approach since, in the Gentry-Waters IBBE scheme [26] , private keys have the same shape as in Gentry's IBE scheme and one of the ciphertext components lives in the group . As already mentioned, the CHK technique does not affect traceability as, upon decryption, ill-formed ciphertexts only get rejected when the one-time signature verification fails. The computational/bandwidth cost of the resulting system exceeds that of the above A-IBE construction only by a small factor.
V. EXTENSION TO IDENTITY-BASED BROADCAST ENCRYPTION
As already stressed in [29] , [30] , reducing the required amount of trust in PKGs is an equally important problem in IBE schemes and their extensions such as attributed-based encryption or IBBE.
In this section, we thus show how the underlying idea of previous schemes can be applied to one of the most efficient IBBE realizations to date.
In [12] , Boneh and Hamburg showed how to turn the BonehBoyen-Goh hierarchical IBE scheme [9] into an efficient IBBE system which is recalled in Appendix A, where we also recall the syntax of the IBBE primitive. This scheme features constantsize ciphertexts and linear-size private keys in the bound on the number of receivers per ciphertext. Their construction was shown to derive from a more general primitive termed "spatial encryption".
Its security (in the selective-ID sense) was established under the -Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption ( -DBDHE) introduced in [9] .
Definition 6: Let be a bilinear-group generator and let be a -valued PPT algorithm. We consider the following random experiments, where is a security parameter:
's advantage is
The bilinear-group generator is said -DBDHE-secure if, for any PPT distinguisher 's advantage is a negligible function of . In this case, we say that the -DBDHE assumption holds for .
In the following, we use the same notations as in [12] and, for any vector , stands for the vector .
A. A Weak Black-Box Accountable Authority IBBE Scheme
The idea of the scheme in Section III applies to construct an IBBE scheme with short ciphertexts and accountable authorities. given a valid private key for the identity and a -useful decoder , the tracing algorithm proceeds using iterations in a similar fashion to previous schemes, by feeding with ciphertexts , for to , and receiver sets containing and other randomly chosen identities. In the generation of and are calculated as specified by the encryption algorithm. On the other hand, is chosen as a random element of and is obtained by applying the decryption algorithm to and . The correctness of the scheme is implied the fact that the decryption key always satisfies the relation and raising both members to the power as in previous schemes.
To avoid repeating the work of Boneh and Hamburg, we prove the security properties of the above A-IBBE system by reducing them to the --security of the underlying IBBE scheme.
Theorem 7:
The above A-IBBE scheme is secure under the -DBDHE assumption. More precisely, any --adversary against it implies an equally successful --attacker against the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme.
Proof: We show that an --adversary against the A-IBBE scheme gives rise to a "real-or-random" --adversary (i.e., in which the adversary outputs a single message and has to decide whether the challenge ciphertext encrypts or a random message) against the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme. Hence, the security of the latter implies the security of our scheme.
When the adversary chooses her set of target identities , with , our adversary forwards to her own challenger and receives a master public key . Then, picks , computes and provides with . At any time, may request an execution of the key generation protocol for an arbitrary identity . At the beginning of each such protocol, sends a commitment and interactively proves knowledge of , which extracts by rewinding . Then, chooses , sets and queries her own --challenger to obtain a private key for the identity chosen by . The latter is turned into an A-IBBE private key and re-randomized by setting where . The new key is easily seen to have the same distribution as those obtained in step 3 of the key generation protocol. Finally, obtains the "blinded key"
, where . In the challenge phase, chooses a pair of target messages . The adversary chooses a random plaintext , which she sends to her own "real-or-random" challenger. The latter replies with a challenge ciphertext for the receiver set , where is either or a random element of . The adversary picks a random bit and computes where and is relayed to as a challenge ciphertext. After a second series of key generation queries, outputs a bit , and outputs "real" if and "random" otherwise. It is easy to see that, if encrypts a random plaintext, then can be expressed as , where and for some . In this case, we obtain that statistically hides (and thus ) since has no information on . In contrast, if encrypts , then is a valid encryption of for the A-IBBE scheme, so that , where the latter advantage function denotes the maximal "real-or-random" advantage of any --adversary against the BonehHamburg IBBE. It comes that 's advantage in the real-orrandom game is exactly .
Theorem 8:
In the selective-ID --game, any PPT adversary has negligible advantage assuming that the -DBDHE assumption holds. More precisely, the probability that the honest user outputs a -useful device that frames the PKG after the tracing procedure is at most with . Proof: Let us assume that, at the end of the selective-ID game, the dishonest user outputs a device for which the tracing algorithm declares the PKG guilty. Then, we show how to obtain an --adversary against the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme in the sense of a real-or-random definition of --security 2 . The adversary plays the --game against a challenger for the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE and plays 's challenger in the selective-ID game. At the outset of the latter, chooses a target identity and then chooses her own sets of target identities as follows: for each , is chosen as a set containing and at most other random identities. When seeing the description of , the IBBE challenger generates a master public key . Then, chooses and sets . The master public key of the A-IBBE system is defined as and given to . Then, starts making a number of key generation queries. For each key generation query involving an identity proceeds by invoking her own challenger , exactly as in 2 Namely, the --adversary chooses sets of challenge identities upfront and starts invoking a key generation oracle (that returns private keys for arbitrary identities) and a challenge oracle that, at its invocation (for ), takes as input a plaintext and returns an IBBE encryption under the set of either or a random plaintext depending on the value of some secret bit that remains constant across all challenge queries. The adversary's goal is then to guess without obtaining the private key of any identity belonging to a set at any time. Using a classical hybrid argument (e.g., see [5Theorem 3]), this notion is easily shown equivalent (with a loss in the security reduction) to the standard --security notion for IBBE schemes. (11) where is the decryption key for the identity and the receiver set , which is obtained from . It is easy to see that, if the challenger is playing the "real" game, forms a valid encryption of . If is playing the "random" game, is distributed as a ciphertext produced by the tracing algorithm.
Similarly to the Proof of Theorem 2, we can show that, if is playing the "real" game, the probability that never outputs the correct plaintext at any iteration is smaller than . If this probability significantly increases when switches to play the "random" game, algorithm must be able to break the --security of the underlying IBBE scheme: at the end of the game that plays against , it says "random" whenever the tracing algorithm points to the PKG and "real" otherwise. Since the result of [12] implies that , the claimed result follows from the security loss coming from the hybrid argument.
As in previous constructions, as long as pirate devices are stateless, no dishonest authority can create a device that gets the tracing procedure to falsely accuse the user and the result holds unconditionally. The proof of the following theorem is omitted since it is completely similar to the proofs of Theorems 3 and 6.
Theorem 9:
In the information theoretic sense, no adversary has an advantage in the -game. It is noteworthy that other IBE-related primitives can be made accountable using the same technique. Due to their algebraic similarities with the "commutative blinding" IBE family, the "large-universe" attribute-based encryption schemes described in [39] , [31] can easily be tweaked to support accountability in the weak black-box model.
VI. CONCLUSION
We described the first A-IBE system allowing for weak black-box traceability while retaining short ciphertexts and private keys. We also suggested a white-box variant that remains secure against dishonest PKGs equipped with a decryption oracle. In the black-box setting, it remains an open problem to achieve the latter property without significantly degrading the efficiency.
In the setting of hierarchical IBE schemes, it would also be desirable to see how the problem can be addressed. When a pirate decoder is found to decrypt ciphertexts intended for a node, one should be able to determine which ancestor(s) of that node should be blamed. APPENDIX BONEH-HAMBURG IBBE SCHEME An Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption scheme, as formalized in [2] , can be seen as an IBE scheme where ciphertexts can be decrypted by more than one receiver. Syntactically, it consists of four algorithms:
• Setup: given a security parameter and a bound on the number of receivers per ciphertext, this algorithm outputs a master key pair .
• KeyGen: is used by the PKG to derive a private key for an identity . (13) and (14) . To explain the second step of the decryption algorithm, we note that, for each , the pair satisfies (16) By raising both sides of (16) to the power , where is the random encryption exponent, we see why can be recovered as per (15) .
The security of this scheme was proved [12] under the -DBDHE assumption in the selective-ID model. In the context of IBBE schemes, the --model was formalized in [2] . It requires the adversary to choose upfront (i.e., before seeing ) the set of identities under which the challenge ciphertext will be generated. The adversary is then allowed to query private keys for identities and eventually aims at guessing which one out of two messages of her choice was encrypted in the generation of . 
